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OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
I.
Appellant Melvin Stinson, who was arrested by local
police in a Philadelphia bar pursuant to an arrest warrant for
failing to appear in court, was found to be in possession of 23
glass vials of cocaine base, totaling approximately 1.5 grams,
and a .357 Magnum revolver.  Thereafter, Stinson pled guilty to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), using and carrying a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The matter is before us on Stinson’s
challenge to his sentence.
The PSR found Stinson to be a career offender under the
2006 United States Sentencing Guidelines based on his 1998
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance and a 1994
conviction for “simple assault.”  The PSR also noted that Stinson
has been convicted of resisting arrest.  The District Court agreed
that Stinson was a career offender, and as a result, gave Stinson
an enhanced offense level of 32.  After deducting 3 points for
acceptance of responsibility, Stinson’s total offense level was 29. 
As a career offender, Stinson had a criminal history category of
 We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 374200.1
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VI and received a Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months
imprisonment.  He was sentenced to 262 months, the bottom of
the range.
Stinson now appeals that decision, claiming that the
District Court (1) incorrectly considered his simple assault crime
to be a crime of violence under the relevant sentencing
provisions and (2) did not reasonably apply the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) factors when determining his sentence.   We will affirm.1
II.
“We exercise plenary review over questions of law, such
as whether a crime is a crime of violence.”  United States v.
Hull, 456 F.3d 133, 137 (3d Cir. 2006).  Although Stinson
admits that the District Court’s conclusion that his simple assault
conviction qualified as a crime of violence was required after
our precedent in United States v. Dorsey, 174 F.3d 331 (3d Cir.
1999), and he notes in his brief that “it would seem to be
difficult to distinguish Dorsey from the case at bar, factually,”
Appellant’s Br. at 10, he argues only that the District Court
“must make a specific finding as to whether the offense of
conviction established a crime of violence by reference to the
charged conduct.”  Appellant’s Br. at 12.  Such an approach
would, of course, deviate from the categorical approach that we
must apply “when analyzing how state statutes fit within the
Sentencing Guidelines.”  United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789,
792 (3d Cir. 2005).
Stinson’s brief does not address the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008), but
that decision does require some discussion.  Begay required that
courts assess whether a crime alleged to create a “serious
potential risk of physical injury to another” not only created the
required “serious potential risk” but was also sufficiently similar
to burglary, arson, extortion, or the use of explosives to qualify
as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (the
 United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 738-39 (4th Cir.2
2009); United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2008).
But cf. United States v. Parson, 995 F.2d 858, 870 (3d Cir. 1992
(concluding that the two definitions are “not coextensive”).  Under
the ACCA:
[T]he term “violent felony” means any crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act
of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a
firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be
punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by
an adult, that–
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . .
. . 
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  For comparison, under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines:
The term “crime of violence” means any offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that–
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another, or
4
“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  128 S. Ct. at 1585.  Although
this case involves the Guidelines, the definition of a violent
felony under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the definition of
a crime of violence under the Guidelines that authority
interpreting one is generally applied to the other.2
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual “U.S.S.G.” § 4B1.2(a) (2006).
 We have previously considered this issue only in an3
unpublished opinion.
 Stinson does not challenge that a 1998 controlled4
substance conviction qualifies as one of the two crimes of violence
or controlled substance offenses.
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Because the issue of whether simple assault can still be
considered a crime of violence after Begay is an issue that would
benefit from initial briefing and exploration before a trial judge,
we may decide this case on an alternative ground if we conclude
that Stinson’s prior conviction for resisting arrest qualifies as a
crime of violence.   If so, it would satisfy the required predicate3
for career offender status.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Stinson is a career
offender if he:  (1) was at least eighteen years old when the
instant offense occurred; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a
crime of violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) he
“has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.”  U.S.S.G. §
4B1.1(a).  The first two requirements are satisfied and are not at
issue here.  We focus therefore on the third requirement.4
A “prior felony conviction” is any “adult federal or state
conviction for an offense punishable by death or imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether such
offense is specifically designated as a felony and regardless of
the actual sentence imposed.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 
Although Stinson’s resisting arrest conviction was classified by
the Pennsylvania statute as a second degree “misdemeanor,” it
carried a potential term of imprisonment of more than one year
and therefore qualifies as a “prior felony conviction” under the
6Sentencing Guidelines.  We must therefore consider whether
Stinson’s 1999 resisting arrest conviction is a crime of violence.
As relevant to this case, the Guidelines define a crime of
violence as “any offense under federal or state law, punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . is
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.”  U.S.S.G. §
4B1.2(a)(2).  We look to Pennsylvania law to ascertain the
nature of the crime of which Stinson was convicted.
Regarding the crime of resisting arrest, the Pennsylvania
Code states that:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,
with the intent of preventing a public servant from
effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the
person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the
public servant or anyone else, or employs means
justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the
resistance.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104.  Under Pennsylvania law, a
crime is considered “a misdemeanor of the second degree if it is
so designated in this title or if a person convicted thereof may be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is
not more than two years.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 106(b)(7). 
Therefore, the crime of resisting arrest meets the first part of the
federal definition of crime of violence because it is punishable
by a period of time exceeding one year.  As we now discuss, we
also hold that resisting arrest meets the second part of the crime
of violence definition.
First, we note that we see no difference between “a
substantial risk of bodily injury” as used in the Pennsylvania
statute and “a serious potential risk of physical injury” as used in
the Guidelines.  However, after the recent Supreme Court
decision in Begay, our analysis must also include an examination
of whether the crime at issue, resisting arrest, is sufficiently
7similar to the crimes of burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion,
and a crime that involves the use of explosives before we can
categorize resisting arrest as a crime of violence.  128 S. Ct. at
1585.
As the Court noted in Begay, the listed crimes are all
similar to each other in that they:
all typically involve purposeful, “violent,” and
“aggressive” conduct. . . . see, e.g., Taylor [v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575,] 598 [(1990)] (“burglary” is an
unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or other
structure with “intent to commit a crime”); ALI Model
Penal Code § 220.1(1) (1985) (“arson” is causing a fire or
explosion with “ the purpose of,” e.g., “destroying a
building . . . of another” or “damaging any property . . . to
collect insurance”); id., § 223.4 (extortion is “purposely”
obtaining property of another through threat of, e.g.,
inflicting “bodily injury”).
Id. at 1586.
Resisting arrest, as defined under Pennsylvania law, is
purposeful, violent, and aggressive.  The Pennsylvania statute
requires that the person act “with the intent of preventing a
public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any
other duty,” thus signifying that the criminalized action is
purposeful.  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104. We also conclude,
without hesitation, that “creat[ing] a substantial risk of bodily
injury,” id., is both aggressive and violent.  We, like the First
Circuit, are confident that resisting arrest, as defined by the
relevant state statute, “is at least as ‘aggressive’ and ‘violent’ as
burglary.”  United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir.
2009) (“Burglary . . . can be described as purposeful but not, at
least in most instances, as purposefully violent or necessarily
aggressive.” (quoting United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 7
n.7 (1st Cir. 2008)).  Our conclusion is also in accord with
United States v. Jennings, 544 F.3d 815 (7th Cir. 2008), another
post-Begay case.
8We therefore hold that resisting arrest under 18 Pa.
C.S.A. § 5104 is a crime of violence as that term is used in
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  Accordingly, Stinson has been convicted
of the two requisite crimes to qualify as a career offender.
We are similarly unpersuaded by Stinson’s argument that
the District Court did not properly consider the § 3553(a)
factors.  Stinson’s argument is, essentially, that the District Court
failed to consider that “not all career criminals are born equal”
and failed to treat Stinson differently than “an individual who
had achieved career criminal status as the result of a string of
serious cases such as murder, rape, robbery, car jacking and
drugs.”  Appellant’s Br. at 18.
The Supreme Court recently stated that, “given the
straightforward, conceptually simple arguments before the judge,
the judge’s statement of reasons . . . , though brief, was legally
sufficient.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2468 (2007) (holding that the level of specificity required for §
3553(a) reasons depends on the circumstances of the case and
that “when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a
particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy
explanation”).  The Court in Rita held that “[t]he record makes
clear that the sentencing judge listened to each argument.  The
judge considered the supporting evidence.”  Id. at 2469.
In this case, the District Court noted that “there were
many times in which there was a fork in the road,” but each time
Stinson “chose to remain committed to [a] life of crime.”  App.
at 69.  The District Court also pointed out that Stinson had been
found with a “substantial amount of drugs” and “a firearm which
is closely associated with drug trafficking.”  App. at 70.  It
concluded that the Guidelines provided an appropriate sentence
given the facts of the case.  Given the straightforward argument
offered by Stinson, we hold that the District Court properly
considered the sentencing factors.
We will therefore affirm the sentence issued by the
District Court.
